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Abstract 
 
In the television show Affari Tuoi a contestant is endowed with a sealed box containing a 
monetary prize between one cent and half a million euros. In the course of the show the 
contestant is offered to exchange her box for another sealed box with the same 
distribution of possible monetary prizes inside. This offers a unique natural laboratory for 
testing the predictions of expected utility theory versus prospect theory using lotteries 
with large stakes. While expected utility theory predicts that an individual is exactly 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the exchange offer, prospect theory predicts 
that an individual should always reject the exchange offer due to the assumption of loss 
aversion. We find that the assumption of loss aversion is violated by 46 percent of all 
contestants in our recorded sample. Thus, contestants do not appear to be predominantly 
loss averse when dealing with lotteries involving large stakes. 
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Loss Aversion? Not with Half-a-Million on the Table! 
1. Introduction 
Substantial experimental evidence from economics and psychology suggests that 
initial endowments have an impact on human preferences. This finding precipitates an 
ongoing debate between two contending theories – conventional expected utility theory 
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)) and psychologically-driven prospect theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman (1979)). Early studies (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
Knetsch (1989), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
and Bateman et al. (1997)) criticize mainstream economic assumptions about preferences 
and argue that people are loss averse. Particularly, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) find 
that when comparing losses with equal-sized gains, people tend to significantly over-
estimate losses, setting the value of losses to the double of the value of equal-sized gains.   
Tversky and Kahneman (1979) believe that the amount of current wealth is a 
reference point, which has an impact on human decisions in risky situations. Loss 
aversion implies that the value function should dramatically alter its slope at the reference 
point. Rabin (2000) proposes a “calibration theorem”, which shows that a concave utility 
function, assumed by expected utility theory, fails to capture this effect. He argues that 
loss aversion can be fully explained by expected utility theory only if the concave utility 
function is assumed to have a kink around the reference point.  
According to Rabin (1998), endowment effect and status quo bias are two 
phenomena, closely related to loss aversion. Endowment effect (Thaler (1980)) says that 
when people come to own a good, they tend to value it more than they did before they 
owned it (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991)). For example, Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler (1990) find that students, who were given mugs worth 5 USD each, were willing 
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to sell them at an average price of 7 USD each. At the same time, students, who did not 
come to possess the mugs, were willing to buy them at an average price of 3.50 USD per 
mug. While many experiments replicate this result, several studies treat endowment effect 
as essentially an inexperienced consumer’s mistake, which disappears in the process of 
learning (e.g. Knez, Smith and Williams (1985), Coursey, Hovis and Schulze (1987), 
Brookshire and Coursey (1987), Shogren et al. (1994)).  
Status quo bias emerges when an individual faces a choice between several goods 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991)).  In this case, a loss averse individual opts for 
maintaining the status quo as opposed to making decisions that may lead to the loss of a 
good, even if this loss is compensated by a gain of another good (Rabin (1998)). 
According to Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) and Knetsch 
(1989) 90 percent of students, initially endowed with a mug (candy bar), are not willing 
to exchange it for candy bar (mug).   
List (2004) has conducted a similar experiment with ordinary consumers and 
professsional dealers on the sportscard market. In this field experiment he finds that while 
trades are infrequent among inexperienced consumers, professional dealers are more 
likely to accept the exchange offer. List (2004) argues that when consumers face decision 
problem, which they have never experienced before, they may overcome the endowment 
effect. In a similar vein, Myagkov and Plott (1997) find that risk-seeking behavior over 
losses, predicted by prospect theory, tends to decrease with experience in a market setting.  
We use the natural laboratory of Italian television show Affari Tuoi3 to analyze the 
effects of loss aversion, when stakes are large. Affari Tuoi is the Italian version of the 
television show Deal or No Deal, produced at different times by the media company 
                                                 
3 In translation from Italian “Your Business”, “Your Affairs”. 
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Endemol in 26 countries worldwide. In Affari Tuoi a contestant is assigned a sealed box, 
containing a monetary prize between 0.01 to 500,000 EUR. At least once during the 
television episode, a contestant is offered to exchange her box for another box, which 
contains the same distribution of possible monetary prizes.4 This provides a unique 
opportunity to test the assumption of loss aversion in a previously unexplored domain – 
when lotteries involve large outcomes (up to half a million euros). Since two boxes that 
may be exchanged contain the same distribution of monetary prizes, a loss averse 
contestant should always reject the exchange offer.5 In contrast, an expected utility 
maximizer is exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting the exchange offer. 
Several studies use natural experiments to draw conclusions about economic 
behavior. Structured as well-defined decision problems or strategic games, television 
shows provide an interesting research material for economic theorists (Metrick (1995)). 
Particularly, using data from the television show The Prize is Right, Bennett and 
Hickman (1993) and Berk, Hughson and Vandezande (1996) test for the optimal 
information updating and rational bidding strategies correspondingly. Gertner (1993), 
Metrick (1995), and Beetsma and Schotman (2001) employ the natural laboratories of 
Card Sharks, Jeopardy! and Lingo television shows respectively to measure individual 
risk attitudes. Levitt (2004) and Antonovics, Arcidiancono and Walsh (2005) examine 
discrimination in The Weakest Link. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) attempt to elicit risk 
attitudes of Affari Tuoi contestants from their decisions on the last three monetary offers. 
                                                 
4 In addition to exchange offers, contestants also receive monetary offers for selling the content of their box. 
5 Notice that this is a stronger implication of loss aversion than in the mug-candy bar exchange experiments 
(List (2004)). In exchange experiments loss aversion implies that the fraction of individuals, who are not 
willing to exchange a mug (candy bar) for a candy bar (mug), should be higher in the treatment where 
subjects were initially endowed with a mug (candy bar) compared to the fraction of subjects in the baseline 
treatment, who were endowed with nothing and subsequently choose a mug (candy bar). Such control 
treatment is not required in our natural experiment because two objects that may be exchanged yield 
identical distributions of monetary prizes. 
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Post, Baltussen and Van den Assem (2006) analyze risk attitudes of Dutch and Australian 
contestants using the natural laboratory of Deal or No Deal. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
television show Affari Tuoi. Section 3 presents the basic statistics about our recorded 
sample of television episodes. Section 4 derives the theoretical predictions of expected 
utility theory and prospect theory. Section 5 relates the theoretical prediction to the 
observed decisions of the contestants. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Description of the Game 
Affari Tuoi is a daily television show, broadcasted on the first channel of Italian 
television RAI Uno. Contestants of Affari Tuoi self-select into the show by calling the 
countrywide selection center. Twenty contestants participate in every episode. Each 
contestant represents one of twenty Italian administrative regions. Every contestant is 
randomly assigned one box that contains one of twenty monetary prizes ranging from 
0.01 to 500,000 EUR. The list of possible prizes is presented in Table 1. All boxes are 
sealed by an independent notary company and are numbered consecutively from 1 to 20. 
Contestants know the list of possible prizes i.e. Table 1 but they do not know the content 
of each box. 
Table 1 Twenty possible prizes (in EUR) 
0.01 10 5 0006 50 000 
0.2 50 10 000 75 000 
0.5 100 15 000 100 000 
1 250 20 000 250 000 
5 500 25 000 500 000 
 
In the beginning of each television episode contestants receive one general 
knowledge question with three possible answers (A, B and C). The contestant, who is the 
                                                 
6 Prize 5 000 Euro was replaced with prize 30 000 Euro starting from January 30, 2006 
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first to answer this question correctly, is selected to play the game.7 During the game, the 
contestant keeps her own box and opens the remaining boxes one by one. When a box is 
opened, the prize hidden inside is publicly revealed and it is erased from the list of 
possible prizes.  
After opening several boxes the contestant receives an offer from the “bank”. The 
offer could be either a monetary price for the content of her box or the possibility to 
exchange her box for any of the remaining sealed boxes. Like contestants, the “bank” 
does not know which prize is hidden inside each box. 
In this paper we analyze the decisions of contestants when they are offered to 
exchange boxes. In every episode, the contestant receives at least one offer to exchange 
her box (typically after opening six boxes8). Occasionally, the contestant also receives the 
second offer to exchange her box (typically when there are only two sealed boxes left9). 
The game terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the “bank” 
or when all boxes are opened. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the content of 
her box, which is opened last. 
3. Basic Statistics 
The natural laboratory of Affari Tuoi, analyzed in this paper, incorporated one 
hundred television episodes, broadcasted on RAI Uno from September 20, 2005 to 
February 14, 2006. The data were transcribed from original television broadcasts.  
                                                 
7 The remaining 19 contestants continue to participate in the next television episode. The contestant who 
was selected to play the game is replaced by a new contestant from the same region. New contestant is 
selected from a pool of volunteers who called the selection center. 
8 Official rules of the show require the “bank” to offer exchange option at least once in every television 
episode. Therefore, the first offer that the “bank” makes is always the exchange offer. Before February 11, 
2006, the first offer was always made after the contestant opened six boxes. Starting from February 11, 
2006, the first offer is made after the contestant opened three boxes. 
9 Including the box in the possession of the contestant. 
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Contestants, aged from 23 to 7010, from all regions of Italy participated in the 
show (Figure 1). An overwhelming majority of contestants (81 percent ) were married, 13 
percent — single, 4 percent — divorced and 2 percent — widowed. 45 percent of Affari 
Tuoi contestants were male and 55 percent were female. Thus, this natural experiment 
relied on a more representative subject pool than the conventional laboratory 
experiments. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
On average, contestants earned 30,363 EUR, with the standard deviation of 
43,815 EUR (the median earnings in the sample amounted to 20,000 EUR). Thus, actual 
average earnings in the show fall short of the ex ante expected value of the prizes from 
Table 1, which is 52,295 EUR. Average final earnings were also lower than the average 
prize in the boxes initially assigned to the contestants who played the game. Figure 2 
shows the distribution of monetary prizes that were initially allocated to the contestants 
who played the game in one hundred episodes in our sample. This distribution is not 
significantly different from a uniform distribution (χ2 = 21.20, p=0.3259). Average initial 
endowment amounted to 39,096 EUR and median initial endowment was 250 EUR.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The minimum prize earned in our sample was 0.01 EUR and the maximum prize 
was 250,000 EUR. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of final prizes, earned by contestants 
across one hundred Affari Tuoi television episodes. Obviously, replicating this natural 
experiment in conventional laboratory conditions would be a highly challenging task, 
since it would require a budget of at least 3,036,332 EUR. Men won on average 946 EUR 
                                                 
10 Sometimes contestants do not reveal their age. The reported minimum and maximum age are derived 
from the subsample of contestants who specified their age during the show. 
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more than women (median earnings were 20,000 EUR both for male and female). 
However, standard deviation for final prizes, received by men, was 12,332 EUR higher 
than that for final prizes, won by women.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
4. Theoretical prediction  
According to expected utility theory, an individual should be exactly indifferent 
between keeping her box and exchanging it for any of the remaining sealed boxes. 
Consider a contestant who is offered an exchange when there are N sealed boxes each 
containing one of the prizes Nxxx <<< ...21  . If an individual keeps her box, she obtains 
expected utility ( )∑ = +Ni ixwuN 11 , where ( ).u  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function of the contestant and w  is her private wealth.  
If the contestant exchanges her box that contains prize ix , { }Ni ,...,1∈ , for one of 
the remaining sealed boxes, she obtains expected utility ( )j
ij
N
j
xwu
N
+− ≠=∑ 11
1 . The 
contestant does not know the content of her box and any prize Nxx ,...,1  is equally likely 
to be inside her box. Therefore, after exchanging the boxes, the contestant receives 
expected utility ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )=+−+−=+− ∑ ∑∑ ∑ = == ≠= Ni iNj jNi jijNj xwuxwuNNxwuNN 1 11 1 11111  
( )∑ = += Ni ixwuN 11 . Thus, the contestant receives exactly the same expected utility after 
exchanging her box as after keeping her initial box. In other words, according to expected 
utility theory there is no reason why the contestant should except or reject an offer to 
exchange her box for one of the remaining sealed boxes. 
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In contrast, according to prospect theory an individual should never exchange her 
own box for any of the remaining sealed boxes due to the assumption of loss aversion. In 
prospect theory, an individual derives utility from changes in wealth rather than from 
absolute wealth levels. Utility from changes in wealth is captured by the value function 
( ).v  which is normalized so that ( ) 00 =v . Individuals are assumed to be loss averse so 
that the value function is steeper for losses than for gains i.e. ( ) ( )xvxv −−<  for any 0>x  
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979)).  Thus, if an individual keeps her own box, she obtains 
utility ( ) 00 =v  because her wealth remains unchanged.  
Now consider an individual who exchanges her own box with prize ix  for a box 
with a lower prize jx , { }1,...,1 −∈ ij . According to the cumulative prospect theory, this 
exchange yields utility ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ijijij ij xxprobwxxprobwxxv −<−−≤⋅− −−−=∑ δδ11 , 
where [ ] [ ]1,01,0: →−w  is the probability weighting function for losses (Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992)) and ( )ij xxprob −<δ  denotes the probability that the change in 
individual’s wealth δ  during the exchange of the boxes is lower than ij xx − .  
Finally, consider an individual who exchanges her own box with prize ix  for a 
box with a higher prize jx , { }Nij ,...,1+∈ . According to the cumulative prospect theory 
this individual obtains utility ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]ijijN ij ij xxprobwxxprobwxxv −>−−≥⋅− +++=∑ δδ1 , 
where [ ] [ ]1,01,0: →+w  is the probability weighting function for gains. The contestant does 
not know the prize ix  sealed inside her box. Thus, her ex ante utility from exchanging the 
boxes is given by ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∑= −−−= +−<−−≤⋅−= Ni ijijij ij xxprobwxxprobwxxvU 1 11 δδ  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∑= +++= −>−−≥⋅−+ Ni ijijN ij ij xxprobwxxprobwxxv1 1 δδ  or, equivalently, by 
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(1)      
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]{
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]}                      1
1
1
jijiji
N
i
i
j ijijij
xxprobwxxprobwxxv
xxprobwxxprobwxxvU
−>−−≥⋅−+
+−<−−≤⋅−=
++
=
−
= −−∑ ∑
δδ
δδ
 
Since all prizes are randomly distributed across the boxes, when two boxes are 
exchanged, every positive change in wealth is equally likely as a negative change in 
wealth of the same absolute amount. In other words, ( ) ( )jiji xxprobxxprob −≤=−≥ δδ  
and ( ) ( )jiji xxprobxxprob −<=−> δδ  for every ij xx < . Assumption of loss aversion 
additionally implies that ( ) ( )ijji xxvxxv −−<−  for every ij xx < . Using these two 
results we can rewrite equation (1) as an inequality 
(2)    
( ) ( )( )[ ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )]ijij
ijij
N
i
i
j ij
xxprobwxxprobw
xxprobwxxprobwxxvU
−<+−≤−
−−<−−≤⋅−<
++
−−=
−
=∑ ∑
δδ
δδ
                                     
1
1
1   
Previous experimental studies demonstrate that the probability weighting function 
is “essentially the same” for gains and losses (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 
Abdellaoui (2000)). Assuming that ( ) ( )pwpw −+ =  for every [ ]1,0∈p , inequality (2) 
immediately implies that 0<U  i.e. the contestant derives a strictly negative utility from 
exchanging her box for one of the remaining sealed boxes. In other words, according to 
prospect theory an individual has a strong reason not to exchange her box: the value of 
exchange is strictly negative because a loss averse individual expects more aggravation 
from losses than the pleasure from gains of the same amount. 
5. Results 
The theoretical analysis in the previous section critically relies on the assumption 
that the monetary prizes from Table 1 are distributed in a random order across the boxes. 
Although this is explicitly stated in the rules of the television show, we verified within 
our recorded sample if every prize indeed appeared to be equally likely to be inside any 
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of twenty boxes. In other words, we checked whether contestants in our sample had an 
apparent reason to believe that the prizes were not randomly distributed.  
Figures 4 and 5 show how many times every prize was sealed inside each box 
across 100 television episodes. For all prizes, this actual distribution is not significantly 
different from a uniform distribution (when every prize appears exactly five times inside 
each box) at 1 percent significance level. This also holds for all prizes except for 50 EUR 
and 500 EUR at 5 percent significance level (the results of the chi-squared test are 
presented on Figures 4 and 5).11 Thus, contestants in our sample did not have any 
apparent reason to suspect that some prizes were more likely to be inside particular 
box(es). 
[INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE] 
In every episode within our sample of observations, a contestant received either 
one or two offers to exchange her box. In 98 percent of all episodes the first (or the only) 
exchange offer was made after the contestant opened six boxes.12 In 27 percent of all 
episodes a contestant received two offers to exchange her box. In 74 percent of all cases 
when the “bank” made the second exchange offer, it was made when there were only two 
unopened boxes left (including the box in the possession of the contestant).13 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the decisions of contestants on the first (or the only) 
exchange offer and the second exchange offer correspondingly. The first (or the only) 
exchange offer was accepted in 39 percent of all cases and the second exchange offer was 
                                                 
11 We also checked the distribution of prizes across twenty administrative regions of Italy whose 
representatives were initially endowed with the boxes. For all prizes we were unable to reject the 
hypothesis that the distribution across regions is not significantly different from a uniform distribution at 5 
percent significance level. 
12 In the remaining two percent of all episodes the “bank” made the first and the only exchange offer when 
three boxes where opened. 
13 In 19 percent of the cases the second exchange offer was made when five unopened boxes were left. In 7 
percent of the cases, the second exchange offer was made when there were eight unopened boxes left.  
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accepted in 37 percent of all cases. Overall in our sample, accepting the exchange offer 
appears to be slightly more rewarding than rejecting the offer. The median prize inside 
unopened boxes excluding the box in the possession of the contestant was higher than the 
prize inside the contestant’s box in 57 percent of all cases when the first (or the only) 
exchange offer was made and in 56 percent of all cases when the second exchange offer 
was made. Ex post, contestants who actually switched the boxes performed even better 
than their slightly more favorable statistical odds. The prize in the new box after the 
exchange was higher than the prize in the old box before the exchange in 67 percent of all 
cases when the first (or the only) exchange offer was accepted and in 70 percent of all 
cases when the second exchange offer was accepted. 
Table 2 Decisions of contestants on the first (or only) exchange offer (N=100) 
Number (percentage) of episodes 
First (or only) 
exchange offer Total 
Median prize in other 
boxes exceeds prize in 
own box before exchange 
Prize in new box after 
exchange exceeds prize in 
old box before exchange 
Accepted 39 (39%) 22 (56%) 26 (67%) 
Rejected 61 (61%) 35 (57%)  
 
Table 3 Decisions of contestants on the second exchange offer (N=27) 
Number (percentage) of episodes First 
exchange 
offer  
Second 
exchange 
offer  Total 
Median prize in other 
boxes exceeds prize in 
own box before exchange 
Prize in new box after 
exchange exceeds prize in 
old box before exchange 
Accepted 3 (11%) 1 (33%) 1 (33%) Accepted 
Rejected 8 (30%) 4 (50%)  
Accepted 7 (26%) 6 (86%) 6 (86%) Rejected 
Rejected 9 (33%) 4 (44%)  
 
High percentage of contestants, who exchange their boxes and do not keep their 
initial endowment, directly contradicts to the prediction of the cumulative prospect 
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theory. The assumption of loss aversion is violated by 46 percent of all contestants in our 
sample (who accepted at least one exchange offer). Thus, contestants do not appear to be 
predominantly loss averse when dealing with large-stake lotteries. 
Expected utility theory predicts that an individual is exactly indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the exchange offer. Thus, we can expect that among contestants, 
who received only one exchange offer, the percentage of individuals who accepted the 
offer is not significantly different from 50 percent. Similarly, among contestants, who 
received two exchange offers, the percentage of individuals who accepted both offers, 
rejected both offers, accepted only the first offer and accepted only the second offer 
should not significantly differ from 25 percent.  
The corresponding chi-squared statistics is χ2 = 3.959 (p=0.0466) for contestants 
who received only one exchange offer and χ2 = 3.074 (p=0.3803) for contestants who 
received two exchange offers. Thus, the hypothesis that contestants are equally likely to 
accept or reject the exchange offer cannot be rejected at 1 percent significance level and it 
is only marginally rejected at 5 percent significance level for contestants who received 
only one exchange offer. In other words, the decisions of contestants of Affari Tuoi 
appear to be consistent with the prediction of expected utility theory. 
6. Conclusion 
Television show Affari Tuoi offers a unique opportunity to research individual 
decision making under risk using large-stake lotteries with outcomes as high as half a 
million euros. Perhaps for the first time since the famous thought experiment of Maurice 
Allais, we have an opportunity to study choice between large-stake lotteries with real 
incentives and real people. Risky lotteries are presented to Affari Tuoi contestants in a 
clear and transparent manner as a list of equiprobable outcomes so that the chances of 
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misperception are minimal. Contestants themselves come from all regions of Italy, being 
widely dispersed in terms of age and occupation, which makes them a more diversified 
subject pool compared to the undergraduate students in the conventional laboratory 
experiments.  
In this paper we analyze the decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants when they are 
offered to exchange their initial endowment for an identical lottery that yields the same 
distribution of possible monetary prizes. While neoclassical expected utility theory 
predicts that an individual should be exactly indifferent about this exchange, 
psychologically-driven prospect theory predicts that a loss averse individual should 
always keep her initial endowment. Both theories make clear and distinct predictions that 
can be easily tested in our natural laboratory. 
We find that 46 percent of all contestants in our recorded sample violated the 
assumption of loss aversion by accepting the exchange offer at least once. Apparently, the 
contestants are not overwhelmingly loss averse when choosing between large-stake 
lotteries even though the potential loss during the swap might be as high as 499,999.99 
EUR. We also find that the decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants are essentially consistent 
with the prediction of expected utility theory. These results suggest that apparently 
inexperienced individuals manage to overcome the effect of loss aversion when dealing 
with an unusual decision problem involving substantial monetary rewards.  
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Figure 1 The Percentage of Episodes, Played by the Representatives of  
Each Italian Region 
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Figure 2 The Distribution of Initial Endowments Across One Hundred Episodes 
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Figure 3 The Distribution of Final Earnings Across One Hundred Episodes 
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Figure 4 The Distribution of Prizes from 0.01 to 500 Euros Across Twenty Boxes  
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Figure 5 The Distribution of Prizes from 5,000 to 500,000 Euros Across Twenty Boxes 
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